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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a civil j 
of $5,174.89 in favor of Plainti 
Honorable David L. Mower, Tenth 
County, sitting without a jury, 
said judgment pursuant to U.C.A. 
and 4 of the Rules of the Court 
lidgment in the amount 
tf entered by the 
pircuit Court, Sevier 
Defendant appealed 
78-4-11 and Rules 3 
f appeals. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
WAS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL TO SUSTAIN 
THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT, ELIZABETH DEWSNUP, IS 
LIABLE FOR THE DEBT OWING TO RESPONDENT, WINKEL, 
FOR GOODS DELIVERED TO THE VALLEY TWIN CINEMAS? 
v 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent, Winkel Distributing, (hereinafter 
referred to as Winkel) is a wholesale food and beverage 
distributor in Richfield, Utah. The Valley Twin Cinema is a 
double movie theater which was constructed and began doing 
business in Richfield, Utah, on or about 1982 (T. 64). Brad 
Whittaker was the manager of the Valley Twin Cinemas from the 
commencement of operations throughout all times relevant herein 
(T. 64). When the Valley Twin Cinemas began doing business, 
Mr. Whittaker opened an account with Winkel under the 
designation of Modern Valley Twin Cinemas |and directed 
Mr. Winkel to send statements to a Delta, Colorado address (T. 
19). The account was kept current initially, but became 
delinquent in 1984 (T. 22). In the fall Q£ 1984, Kim Winkel, 
owner and manager of Winkel Distributing, contacted Brad 
Whittaker on several occasions to attempt to have the account 
brought current. Mr. Whittaker was unable to get the account 
current and Winkel requested the name of the owner to contact 
to collect on the account. Mr. Whittaker informed him that the 
Appellant, Elizabeth Dewsnup, hereinafter Mrs. Dewsnup, was the 
individual to contact in order to get the account brought 
current. Mr. Whittaker provided a telephone number and Winkel 
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thereafter contacted Elizabeth Dewsnup on two or three 
occasions by telephone (T. 26). On each of these 
conversations, Winkel informed Elizabeth Dewsnup that he was 
calling regarding the Valley Twin Cinemas and their delinquent 
account in the approximate sum of $4,000.00. Mrs. Dewsnup on 
each telephone conversation acknowledged the obligation, 
apologized for the delinquency, claimed she was behind in her 
bills, but she would try to get some money on the account 
within the next few days. At no time did Mrs. Dewsnup deny 
liability for the account (T. 28, 29). 
As a result of Mrs. Dewsnup promises to pay, 
Winkel postponed taking action on the account and continued 
permitting the theatre manager to charge for goods delivered 
(T. 28). When payments on the account were not received as 
provided, Winkel discontinued credit with the last charge being 
in May, 1985. After further demands for payment without 
response, Mr. Winkel filed the present action. At no time 
prior to the filing of the action did Appellant, Mrs. Dewsnup, 
or her manager, Brad Whittaker, claim that liability for the 
account rested with a Colorado corporation. To the contrary, 
both Dewsnup and Whittaker repeatedly acknowledged liability on 
the account and promised payment. As noted in the copies of 
the invoices attached as a addendum to Appellant!s brief, the 
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account originated in the name of Valley Twin Cinemas and was 
therefore referred to a Modern Twin Cinemas, Modern Cinema, 
Twin Cinema, Valley Cinemas and Cinema Twins. No where in any 
of the accounts, deposit slips or other accountings is there 
any evidence of a corporate existence. 
As previously noted, Brad Wtkittaker was the 
manager of the Valley Twin Cinemas from tljieir opening until 
December of 1985 when he purchased the saijie from Appellant, 
Elizabeth Dewsnup (T. 63, 64). Mr. Whittaker testified at 
trial that when he was approached by Winkdl regarding the 
delinquent account, he referred them to Mifs. Dewsnup (T. 65); 
that if there were any problems regarding|the Twin Cinemas, 
that he would contact Mrs. Dewsnup (T. 68), that Mrs. Dewsnup 
had, in fact, paid property taxes on the Equipment prior to 
June, 1985, (alleged take over date), (T, 
testified that he was operating not only tihe Valley Twin 
Cinemas, but also the Huish Theatre in Ricihfield during 1984 
and that he received pay checks for managing both theatres from 
Elizabeth Dewsnup under her dba Citi Cinemas (T. 72, 73), that 
candy and gum and so forth were purchased 
theatres and payment alternated between thie theatres (T. 73) 
In the fall of 1984, Mr. Whittaker testifi 
new deposit slips and that all proceeds from the Valley Twin 
70, 71). Mr. Whittaker 
jointly for both 
ed that he received 
-3-
Theatres were deposited directly in an account with the heading 
of Citi Cinema, the dba for Elizabeth Dewsnup (T. 80); that 
Mr. Whittaker did not have authority to withdraw money from the 
account and that all pay checks during this period were signed 
by Elizabeth Dewsnup (T. 81, 82). 
When called to testify, Appellant, Elizabeth 
Dewsnup, acknowledged that she had picked up the payroll for 
the Valley Twin Cinemas in exchange for favors from Modern 
Cinema, with full knowledge that Modern Cinema was having 
difficulty paying their bills (T. 91, 92). That her reason for 
picking up the payroll was to keep the operation going until 
she could take over (T. 94). Mrs. Dewsnup also acknowledged 
that she had paid some utilities and other obligations during 
the later part of 1984 and deposited all proceeds from the 
Valley Twin Theatres in her account (R29.30). When questioned 
regarding the telephone calls with Winkel, Mrs. Dewsnup said 
she did not recall any telephone calls, but if there was any, 
it was only one (T. 96, 104). Mrs. Dewsnup testified that she 
was the only one who had access to the monies being deposited 
in her account from Valley Twin Cinemas (T. 104). Elizabeth 
Dewsnup testified that prior to her alleged purchasing in the 
fall of 1984, that she was acquainted with the manager, Brad 
Whittaker; that she had become acquainted by stopping in on 
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regular occasions to pick up papers or posters for Modern 
Cinema. If her other theatre was short on popcorn, she would 
have Valley Twin Theatre popcorn for them, or if she ran out of 
supplies, Valley Twin Theatre would provide supplies for her 
other theatres (T. 108). This sharing was going on despite 
Appellant's claim that Modern was the sole owner of the 
Richfield theatres and Elizabeth Dewsnup was the sole owner of 
the Beaver theatre (T 108, 109). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENJ 
The judgment of the trial Court should be 
affirmed on the grounds that there is sufficient evidence in 
support of the findings of fact and that the Appellant has 
failed to meet the threshold burden marshalling all evidence in 
support of the findings and demonstrating that they are clearly 
erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MEET THE THRESHOLD 
REQUIREMENT OF MARSHALLING ALL EVIDENCE IN FAVOR^OF THE 
FINDINGS AND SHOWING THEY ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
Rule 52a of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
sets the standard for review of civil judgments entered by the 
trial Court without a jury. This rule requires a showing by 
the individual attacking the findings of fact, that the same 
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are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence. Subsequent 
case law has placed the burden on the Appellant to marshal all 
evidence in favor of the findings and then demonstrate that the 
same are clearly erroneous in light of this evidence. Harker 
v. Condominiums Forrest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) 
In the instant case Appellant has merely 
reiterated the facts as he viewed them at the trial in an 
effort to support his position. Findings of fact one through 
twelve do not appear to be in dispute. As to findings thirteen 
through sixteen, the Appellant has failed to marshall any of 
the supporting evidence nor has she attempted to discredit or 
illustrate that it is clearly erroneous. Instead, Appellant 
has simply reiterated evidence in support of his proposed 
position. 
The failure of Appellant to meet this threshold 
is neither elective nor optional and the trial Court1s findings 
and judgment should be affirmed. Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 
supra. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURTTS FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED 
BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, AND ARE NOT CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS AND THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
As previously noted, findings of fact one through 
twelve of the Court have never been disputed and are supported 
by the evidence. 
Finding of fact number thirteen is supported by 
the testimony of the manager, Brad Whittaker (T. 72, 73). 
Mrs. Dewsnup also acknowledged she had paid the manager but 
claimed it was merely to preserve the business until she could 
take over (T. 91, 92). 
As to finding of fact numbeif fourteen, 
Plaintiff's manager contacted the manager of Valley Twin 
Cinemas in Richfield, Utah, demanding payment for the goods 
supplied. He was told to contact the Defendant. This finding 
is supported not only by Mr. Winkel!s testimony (T. 26) but 
also the testimony of Brad Whittaker, the manager (T. 65). 
As to finding number fifteer^ , Winkel contacted 
Mrs. Dewsnup demanding payment for the goods supplied. 
Mrs. Dewsnup did not dispute the claim but asked for time to 
pay it since the business was short of mon|ey. Mr. Winkel 
testified unequivocally that he had discussed the Richfield 
account with Mrs. Dewsnup on two or three occasions. That on 
each occasion she had acknowledged the obligation, admitted 
that she was behind on her bills and promised she would make a 
payment within the next few days (T. 28, 29). When questioned 
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regarding these conversations, Mrs. Dewsnup stated she did not 
recall any telephone conversations but if there were any, there 
was only one (T. 96, 104). Later in her testimony Appellant, 
Elizabeth Dewsnup, testified she never agreed to pay Modern1s 
bills and attempted to rationalize the conversation described 
by Winkel as merely a misunderstanding and that she thought he 
was talking about the Beaver theatre when demanding payment. 
As appropriately pointed out by the Court (T. 117), at the time 
of the alleged conversations, the Beaver account was at most 
$64.00, while the account called on by Winkel was for over 
$4,000.00. The Court clearly questioned the credibility of 
Mrs. Dewsnup and found the testimony of the Plaintiff Winkel to 
be more believable under the circumstances. Finding number 
fifteen is not "clearly erroneous". 
Finding number sixteen of the trial Court is that 
Defendant is the alter ego of Modern Cinemas Inc. The alter 
ego concept under these circumstances should be analyzed under 
the principles of agency. 
Elizabeth DewsnupTs relationship to the Twin 
Theatres could hardly be classified as anything less than an 
implied agency or agency by estoppel. As noted in 3 Am Jur 2d 
Section 18: 
"The existence of an implied agency, for 
example, may be inferred from prior habits 
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or from a course of dealings of a similar 
nature between the parties, especially where 
the agent has repeatedly been permitted to 
perform similar acts in the past11. 
Under Section 19 of the same authority: 
Man agency by estoppel may be created 
insofar as third persons are concerned . . 
that is, it may arise from acts and 
occurrences which lead third persons to 
believe that it has been created. Agency by 
estoppel may be apparent on^y and exist 
because of the estoppel of tjhe principal or 
agent to deny the same afteij the third party 
has relied on such appearande, so that such 
third party would be prejudiced if the facts 
were shown to be otherwise.!1 
If we review the conduct of Appellant Elizabeth 
Dewsnup in relation to the Valley Twin Cinemas it becomes 
patently obvious that she had more than a passing interest. 
For a period of over five years she visited the theatre 
frequently, either picking up papers or delivering posters 
(T. 108, 109). If her theatre in Beaver ran out of supplies, 
she would contact the manager at the Valley Twin Cinemas and 
have them prepare popcorn, etc. (T. 109); in 1984 she began 
depositing proceeds from the Valley Twin Cinemas in her account 
and then chose to pay certain obligations such as payroll, 
utilities and telephone payments while at the same time 
choosing not to pay suppliers such as Winkel (T. 29, 30, 94, 
and affidavit of Elizabeth Dewsnup). Upon contacting the 
manager of the Valley Twin Cinemas in the fall of 1984, 
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Mr. Winkel was directed to Elizabeth Dewsnup as the party 
responsible for obligations by the manager of the theatres 
(T.26). Upon contacting Mrs. Dewsnup on two or three 
occasions, Mr. Winkel testified and the Court so found, that 
she acknowledged the liability, requested more time for payment 
and promised to pay (R. 39, 40). The only logical conclusion 
that can be drawn from these facts is that Elizabeth Dewsnup 
was acting in at least an agency capacity for the corporation 
as to Winkel. 
If we review the evidence in a light most 
favorable to Appellant, and determine that Elizabeth Dewsnup 
was, in fact, only an agent of Modern Cinema, Inc., then we 
must analyze what evidence would support her liability on the 
account and thus make her the !!alter ego!! of the principal 
Modern Cinema, Inc. 
As stated in 3 Am Jur 2d, Section 316: 
Thus, the agent of an undisclosed 
principal may be held liable on the 
contract as the real obligor because he 
contracted in that capacity, and an 
undisclosed principal may be held liable 
because as the recipient of the deal, he 
should also assume its burdens. 
In Section 317 of the same authority it states: 
It has generally been held that the 
liability of an undisclosed principal and 
his agent is an alternative liability 
rather than a joint liability or a joint 
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and several liability, ahd that the third 
party, after he becomes ^ware of the 
agency and identity of t^ ie principal, is 
put to an election to hold either the 
agent or the principal liable, but not 
both. 
In the instant case Winkel testified that as far 
as he knew Elizabeth Dewsnup was the owner and responsible 
party for the Valley Twin Cinemas (T. 55). That his basis was 
that the manager had told him she was thejresponsible party and 
that he had called Mrs. Dewsnup and she had acknowledged it was 
her responsibility. It should also be noted that none of the 
documentation submitted by Appellant, including deposit slips 
for Modern Cinema, have any designation of a corporation. It 
is undisputed in the evidence that Mrs. Dewsnup was aware in 
the fall of 1984 that Modern Cinema, Inc. was having trouble 
paying their bills (T. 91, 92) but despite this knowledge when 
contacted by Mr. Winkel she did not refer him to any 
corporation, but rather acknowledged her qwn liability and 
promised payment (T. 28, 29). The result of Mrs. Dewsnup 
representation was that Winkel withheld collection efforts and, 
in fact, granted more credit to the Valley Twin Cinemas (T. 21, 
28). This extension of additional considejration is sufficient 
to bind tiie agent for the entire obligation even if a portion 
is considered as preexisting debt. 3 Am Jur 2d, Agency, 
Section 308 
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Under this set of facts, the Court could have 
relied on undisclosed agency, estoppel or new consideration to 
find Mrs. Dewsnup liable as the alter ego of Modern Cinema, Inc. 
CONCLUSIONS 
affirmed, 
The judgment of the trial Court should be 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of June, 1988 
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